Database data security

1 .Database data security through the lens of cryptographic engineering Eugene Pilyankevich, Chief Technical officer, Cossack Labs 

2 . Data breaches, annually 1093 783 781 614 419 447 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 

3 . Airplane crashes, annually 46 33 33 29 21 23 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 

4 . Airplane crashes? 1093 783 781 614 419 447 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 

5 .Sensitive data 101 Any data, leakage or tampering of which can lead to damage to data owner, data holder or related third parties. 

6 .Naïve security model 

7 .Naïve security model Focused on Ops-driven components 

8 .Naïve security model Few generic vectors Passive attacks Smash’n’grab 

9 .Securing the naïve security model § encryption-at-rest § encryption-in-transit § access distribution & control § event monitoring 

10 .Pragmatic security model 

11 .Real attackers are: § Smart and resourceful … targeting an old § Multi-skilled vulnerability that § Many vectors of attack you forgot to patch. 

12 .Pragmatic security model Poor perimeter 

13 .Pragmatic security model Poor perimeter Active and/or persistent attacks 

14 .Pragmatic security model Poor perimeter Active and/or persistent attacks Data-specific attacks 

15 .Pragmatic security model Poor perimeter Active and/or persistent attacks Data-specific attacks Systematic approach 

16 .… anything else? 

17 .Idealistic security model 

18 .Idealistic security model: Future is now Future is reliable Working as guinea pig is a great idea 

19 .Idealistic security model: Less than 10 years in public Assumptions assumptions Not tested in production 

20 .Database encryption 

21 .What does encryption do? Encryption narrows attack surface from data to keys 

22 .Database encryption Classic Modern 

23 .Classic attacks § Smash ‘n’ grab § Snapshot attacker § Persistent passive attacker 

24 .Сlassic encryption? Row/column/table Database files Full disk encryption 

25 .Сlassic encryption? Row/column/table NO DIFFERENCE Database files Full disk encryption 

26 .Сlassic encryption, defeated Leak keys: § Host compromise or snapshot § MiTM to leak from traffic Leak plaintext: § Host compromise § Passive/active MiTM § Source compromise 

27 .Extended classic security Protect data Protect database host Protect transport 

28 .Typical modern attacks § Flow alternation (SQL Injection) § VM image leak § Full compromise (temporary or persistent) 

29 .